Item Number (FLOC): Item Description: Redundancies and Protective Features: Reliability Data (if available):				Built-in test equipment: Can equipment / system / plant be operated with item inoperative? Describe limitations: Operating phases: Operating context:		
	y Data (n' aranabio).	FFMEA		Consequences - Decisions - Tasks		
RCMREF	Function Statements (Quantitative Performance Requirements)	Failed States (Ways Performance is Lost)	Failure Causes (Modes)	Failure (Local and Global) Effects H C T D R Maintenance Tasks (procedure, materials, tools, precautions) or short description of the second		
procee C: Ca proba sense T: Is t	ecision algorithm. Upon determin ed from left to right by answering th n CBM reliably detect the 'failing' s bility and/or its consequences to a to perform this task at the frequen here an age (useful life) at which th	ne questions: tate early enough to reduct tolerable level? Does it m icy required? ne probability of failure du	ce the failure's ake economic e to this failure	H = Hidden S = Safety/Environment (HSE) O = Operational N = Non-operational • record the consequences • record the most "noble" task that is applicable and effective.		
(TBM) level? D: Is a a toler interva 2:Can reduce (pract	a detection task applicable? Will it i able level. Is it effective? Is it prac al? a combination of 2 or more TBM a e the safety consequences to a tole cal)?	ry and/or its consequence reduce the multiple failure tical to do the task at the and CBM tasks be effective erable level)? Are they ap	s to a tolerable 's probability to required 'e (avoid or plicable	what sequence of events (component level to organization) could be touched off by the failure mode? now does the failure make itself known? What observable events lead up to the failure? now is safety or the environment impacted? (without mentioning the words "safety" or "environment") now is production impacted? (quality, cost, customer service) s there any additional damage caused? Are there currently any mitigating circumstances or tasks? now long will it take and what actions must be accomplished to correct the failure? How does the likelihood of this failure depend on deeper causes? Has it happened before? How often? Under what rcumstances? How likely or unlikely is this failure mode considered to be?		
-	time nor condition based activities design compulsory (H or S), option	al (O or N)	etc.), l • it is t • decid	ally written as a noun followed by (optionally) an action phrase and a <i>due-to</i> clause (fatigue, abrasion, erosion, corrosi lubrication, dirt, incorrect process / materials, incorrect assembly / setup / operation, etc. the event that causes the loss in functionality (i.e. the failed state) de how many reasonalbly likely failure modes (per failed state) to include (balance likelihood and consequences) ide how low on the causality chain to go (to the level that can be addressed by a suitable task).	אר, חונ	
• us • lis • us hea • se • sp	ter.)	the requirements of the u contains at least one (pre- uirements, <u>not</u> the asset's function (e.g. to be capat Appearance-Control/conta artup, during operation, du	ser? (in its current op erably more) quantit design or initial cap le of, to be able to, ain/comfort-Health&s uring shutdown, durin	 tative performance standards pability. make subsequent transcription to SOPs and CMMS paber of a standby safety-Efficiency-Structure/superfluous paber of a standby <li< td=""><td>3</td></li<>	3	

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